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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Pricing goods and services is a challenging task. Whether it is performed by a producer 
interested in maximizing profits or revenues, or by a social planner interested in maximizing the 
welfare of producers and consumers, the information about the market, product prices, 
purchasing decisions by customers, their characteristics, as well as attributes of the products, are 
required to properly conduct a price analysis. Contingent Valuation Methods (CVM) are 
appropriate in situations when the required market information is not readily available or when 
transaction information does not include consumers or producers who might enter the market at 
alternative prices.  We will develop a strategy that may provide useful information for 
establishing pricing policy and marketing strategies, regardless of whether the decision maker is 
a producer or a social planner.  
More precisely, in this study we use a CVM survey to extract willingness to pay for 
goods and services in the context of joint purchasing decisions.  Our context are goods that fit 
naturally in clusters such that the demand for any one good cannot be treated as independent 
because each item in the group has unobserved attributes which are shared by all other goods in 
the group, and prompt consumers to reveal their taste for the group due to these common 
attributes. Multivariate probit analysis is shown to be helpful in capturing these unobserved taste 
and its impacts on the complementary or substitutability of the goods.  
Besides employing standard willingness to pay estimation methods, we extend the 
analysis by adapting Greene’s (2003) conditional marginal effects to estimate reservation prices 
(or willingness to pay) conditional on having decided to purchase another offered product. This 
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allows the identification of unobserved taste for the offered goods which informs marketing and 
pricing strategies. To our knowledge, none of the previous studies exploited this capacity of 
conditional probabilities.   
Additionally, after estimating standard own-price elasticities that can be easily computed 
directly from demand equations, we propose a method to estimate compensated cross-price 
elasticities of substitution among goods by using the correlation among the errors in the demand 
equations. In the context of these goods, ignoring this correlation may induce inaccurate 
estimation of the cross-price effects.  These compensated elasticities may be useful in cases 
when i) only pure substitution effects are of interest, ii) when decomposition of uncompensated 
elasticity between income and price effects is relevant, iii) or in cases when the uncompensated 
effect is the objective but an approximation can be achieved provided income effect is 
sufficiently low because, for example, the product’s share in income is low due to its relatively 
low price. 
Finally, the existence of cross-price effects in demand prompts setting a pricing strategy 
which considers all offered goods simultaneously instead of establishing each price 
independently from the rest of the products. In our approach, we let the social planner to solve 
for the optimal pricing strategy which maximizes both producer’s revenues and consumer’s joint 
latent utility, conditional on the weight assigned by the planner to each agent.   
We illustrate our methods using a dataset from an artificial market survey in which each 
participant is offered successive randomly priced tickets for alternative varsity sports at a 
Midwestern University. These methods can be extended in a straightforward fashion to other 
private or public goods and services.  
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains a literature review 
relevant for our study and section 3 presents the methodology. Section 4 discusses the data used 
in the application, section 5 presents results of the application, and section 6 concludes.   
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
An important input for establishing prices and pricing policy is the assessment of 
willingness to pay by consumers for products of interest, and there are numerous methods 
employed to elicit willingness to pay.  The most direct is using information from actual purchase 
data. Transaction information does not suffer from hypothetical bias, and additionally, precise 
information from price changes of similar products can be exploited. However, observed 
variation in prices is limited, and so, many potential consumers are not observed making 
purchases at prevailing prices although they would enter at lower prices.  For some markets, 
transaction prices do not exist as with public or environmental goods and services. Experimental 
price information such as that obtained through CVM are often used in place of transactions data 
when researchers require a more complete characterization of the full range of consumer 
demands.1,2  
The CVM also allows computation of own- and cross-price effects when market data is 
not available. Examples include price responses for environmental services and public goods 
(Hökby and Söderqvist 2003; Briscoe et al. 1990; Cummings et al. 1994; and Thomas and Syme 
1988), products grown in South Carolina (Carpio and Isengildina-Massa 2009), wild bear bile in 
China (Hepburn & Macdonald, 2011), and six types of orange juice products (Shi et al. 2014).  
                                                 
1 By varying hypothetical prices, even outside the range of existing market prices, the researcher can observe how 
many more consumers enter the market as prices fall. If the deviations from true purchase decisions are random, the 
averaged responses will still provide accurate predictions of market demands. Among its drawbacks, it requires large 
samples to capture market responses across a large range of prices, and it is possible that respondents are not truthful 
about their answers.  
2 For a more detailed review of Contingent Valuation approach and its limitations we derive the reader to Diamond 
and Hausman (1994), Carson et al. (2001), Lusk and Schoreder (2004) and Venkatachalam (2003). 
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Other studies used CVM in the context of categorical dependent variable estimation 
methods. Ma and Seetharaman (2004) estimated the choice of a set of household items using 
multivariate logit models,3 and Mataria et al. (2007) used survival analysis to estimate the own 
price effect of certain health care improvements. Maynard et al. (2004), by means of an 
experimental store in which individual choose between 5 types of meat products, computed 
demand elasticities.4 
In the studies listed above, demand equations contain own- and cross- prices as 
explanatory variables, and so cross-price effects can be computed from the marginal effects of 
prices on demand. To our knowledge, no other study have restored to the use of the cross 
correlation across demand equations to compute cross-price effects.   
The multivariate probit model, first used by Ashford and Swoden (1970), at first suffered 
from limited use due to computing power limitations but its utilization has increased with the 
improvements in computing capacity.  Prominent applications include Young et al. (2009) who 
analyzed claims in a portfolio of insurance policies, Contoyannis and Jones (2004) who studied 
health production functions and lifestyle equations, and Chib and Greenberg (1998) who 
evaluated tradeoffs between commuting and buying a car.  The application closest to ours is Chib 
et al. (2002) who used a 12th-variate probit model to study the effects of prices on household 
purchasing decisions, but employing household’s market transactions and a Bayesian approach. 
However, although Chib et al (2002) report price effects, they do not compute elasticities of 
substitution, and do not compute willingness to pay.  
                                                 
3 They state that this model allows the estimation of the cross-correlation coefficients separately from the joint 
purchase outcomes. Additionally, they state that the cross-correlation estimates are smaller in magnitude but equal in 
sign to those of multivariate probit. 
4 In this two-stages approach, first a probit model describes the participation decision (i.e. a non-zero consumption 
decision) and then a Poisson regression truncated at zero identifies the consumption decision. 
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In the sports literature, CVMs are mainly restricted to capturing aggregated willingness to 
pay to assess whether a sport generated sufficient positive externalities to justify government 
construction of new sports venues (Johnson and Whitehead, 2000), attracting a professional 
hockey team (Johnson, Groothuis, and Whitehead, 2001), retaining professional football and 
basketball teams (Johnson, Mondello, and Whitehead, 2007); or supporting amateur sports and 
recreation programs (Johnson et al. 2007).   
3. METHODOLOGY 
Our context will be purchase decisions regarding sporting event tickets, but ours is a 
special case of purchase decisions regarding items in a product group where the items are not 
perfect substitutes for one another.  An individual i is offered sequential options to purchase J 
products at exogenously given prices, denoted as ௜ܲଵ, ௜ܲଶ, …, ௜ܲ
௃. The purchase choices are given 
by 
ܤ௜ଵ∗ ൌ 	ߚ଴ଵ ൅ ߚଵଵ ௜ܲଵ ൅ ࢆ௜ᇱࢾଵ െ ߟ௜ଵ 
 
(1) 
ܤ௜ଶ∗ ൌ 	ߚ଴ଶ ൅ ߚଵଶ ௜ܲଶ ൅ ࢆ௜ᇱࢾଶ െ ߟ௜ଶ 
 
⋮ 
ܤ௜௃∗ ൌ 	ߚ଴௃ ൅ ߚଵ௃ ௜ܲ௃ ൅ ࢆ௜ᇱࢾ௃ െ ߟ௜௃ 
 
 
where ܤ௜௝∗ , j = 1, 2, … , J represents the latent utility associated with purchasing product  j at the 
offered price, ௜ܲ
௝, holding constant a vector of individual characteristics Z௜ and unobservable 
factors represented by ߟ௜௝. In practice, we do not observe	ܤ௜௝∗, but we do observe the choice of 
whether or not the individual buys each product. For j = 1, 2, … , J, indexing each option, let the 
binary choices be represented by  
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ܤ௜௝ ൌ ቊ
1 ݂݅ ܤ௜௝∗ ൐ 0
0 ݂݅ ܤ௜௝∗ ൑ 0
 (2) 
which implies that individual i purchases item j if it yields positive utility.  
 Most studies treat these purchase decisions as independent.  This is unlikely to be the case 
in reality, as almost any purchase has substitute or complement goods. In our context, attendance 
takes time, and so, spending time on one event leaves less time available for others, making 
competing events natural substitutes.  On the other hand, brand or product line loyalty may 
create complementarity among goods sharing the brand so that buying one option would be 
positively correlated with purchasing decisions for other products in the cluster.5  To 
accommodate that possibility, we assume that the unobserved factors in equation (1) are jointly 
distributed standard normal with correlation coefficients ߩ௝௞	 	0வ
ழ , for ݆ ് ݇ 
ۏێ
ێێ
ۍߟ௜ଵߟ௜ଶ⋮
ߟ௜௃ے
ۑۑ
ۑې ~ܰቌ૙, ቎
1 ⋯ ߩଵ௃
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
ߩଵ௃ ⋯ 1
቏ቍ (3) 
By calculating the joint probabilities that Pr[ܤ௜ଵ=1, ܤ௜ଶ=1, …, ܤ௜௃=1], Pr[ܤ௜ଵ=1, ܤ௜ଶ=1, …, ܤ௜௃=0], 
and so on up to Pr[ܤ௜ଵ=0, ܤ௜ଶ=0, …, ܤ௜௃=0], we find the following log-likelihood function for the 
model: 
ܮ൫ܤ௜ଵ, ܤ௜ଶ, … , ܤ௜௃| ௜ܲଵ, ௜ܲଶ, … , ௜ܲ௃, ࢆ௜, ࢼ૙, ࢼ૚, ࢾ, ࣋൯ ൌ 
(3) 
෍ log	ሼߔ୎
௡
݅ൌ1
ሾݍ1݅ ቀߚ01 ൅ ߚ11ܲ1݅ ൅ ࢆ′݅ࢾ1ቁ ,… , ݍ݅ܬ ቀߚ0ܬ ൅ ߚ1ܬ ܲ݅ܬ ൅ ࢆ′݅ࢾܬቁ , ܳ ∙ ࣋ሿሽ 
where ࢼ૙ ൌ ሾߚ଴ଵ, … , ߚ଴௃ሿ, ࢼ૚ ൌ ሾߚଵଵ, … , ߚଵ௃ሿ, ࢾ ൌ ሾߜଵ,… , ߜ௃ሿ, ߔ୎ is the J-variate standard normal 
cumulative distribution function; and for all j, ݍ௜௝ is conveniently defined as ݍ௜௝ ൌ 2ܤ௜௝ െ 1. The 
                                                 
5 For example, in sport events, loyalty to a team, often crosses sports because of an individual’s residence, circle of 
friends, or school affiliation. 
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term (ܳ ∙ ࣋) is the ܬ ൈ ܬ variance-covariance matrix but defined in terms of correlation 
coefficients. It equals the dot-product between the ܬ ൈ ܬ	symmetric matrix of correlation 
coefficients between equations (࣋) and a ܬ ൈ ܬ symmetric matrix (ܳ) where each entry ܳ௝௞ ൌ
ܳ௞௝ ൌ ݍ௝ݍ௞ߩ௝௞ for j ≠ k, and ܳ௝௞ ൌ 1 for j = k. 
Estimation of unconditional willingness to pay or reservation prices 
The parameter estimates from (3) can be used to estimate willingness to pay for each 
product. This can be done following the contingent valuation approach by Cameron (1988) and 
Train (2003 pp. 168). 
We measure willingness to pay by the reservation price: the price at which individual i is 
indifferent between purchasing and not purchasing an option that is offered. We can derive an 
estimate of the reservation price for each of the J purchase options as the value of ௜ܲ
௝ such that 
Prൣܤ௜௝ ൌ 1൧ = 0.50. This probability of purchasing represents the demand for good  j by the 
individual i.  Algebraically, the reservation prices ݌௜௝ implicitly solve the equation for each j: 
Prൣܤ௜௝ ൌ 1൧ ൌ Φ൫ߚመ଴௝ ൅ ߚመଵ௝݌௜௝ ൅ ࢆ௜ᇱࢾ෡௝൯ ൌ 0.5 (4) 
where Φ is the univariate standard normal cumulative distribution function and “^” indicates the 
estimated value of the parameter. Given that the standard normal probability density function is 
symmetric and centered on zero, the implicit equations for each  ݌௜௝ simplify to  
ߚመ଴௝ ൅ ߚመଵ௝݌௜௝ ൅ ࢆ௜ᇱࢾ෡௝ ൌ 0 
݌௜௝ ൌ െ
1
ߚመଵ௝
൫ߚመ଴௝ ൅ ࢆ௜ᇱࢾ෡௝൯ 
(5) 
The natural measure of the reservation price is the one that sets the probability of 
purchase equal to 0.5 as in equation (4).  However, in principle, we could evaluate (4) at any 
common probability of ticket purchase.  Because the probability of purchasing is monotonically 
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decreasing in price, the rank order of individual preferences for each option is invariant to the 
choice of probability. Furthermore, as shown by Cameron (1988), a contingent valuation 
approach will yield numerically identical estimates of the willingness to pay as we derive at the 
probability of purchase equal to 0.5.6   
Estimation of unobserved correlation between products 
The elements of matrix	࣋, ߩ௝௞ for j ് k, measure the unobserved correlation in the error 
terms of the demand for products j and k. A positive estimate implies that unmeasured attributes 
that increase the likelihood of purchasing product j also increase the likelihood of purchasing 
product k.  A positive and large correlation for any pair implies prospects for cross-marketing 
strategies between the two products.   
Estimation of conditional reservation prices  
Important conclusions can be derived from computing the probability of purchasing 
product j conditional on having purchased product k. For example, we can document the 
implications of common taste that individuals have for any pair of products (j,k) by comparing 
the reservation price that solves the conditional probability of purchasing product j conditioned 
on purchasing product k, with the reservation price that solves the unconditional probability of 
purchasing j. If the unobserved correlation between j and k is positive so the two goods have a 
source of complementarity in their unobserved tastes, independent of the regressors, then we 
would expect a greater probability of purchasing product j conditional on buying k than we 
would estimate using the unconditional probability.  
Dropping the subscript i that indexes individuals in the sample, we are interested in 
computing the cross-reservation price for product j which arises from setting to 0.5 the expected 
                                                 
6 Rosas and Orazem (2014) provide a proof of the equivalence between this approach and the one proposed by 
Cameron (1988). 
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value of purchasing product j (ܤ௝ ൌ 1) conditional on purchasing product k (ܤ௞ ൌ 1), and given 
the observed decision each individual made regarding the remaining options (ܤି௝ ൌ ܾି௝). The 
conditional probabilities computations following Christofides et al. (1997), Greene (2003 pp. 
713), and Greene (2009 pp.76) is: 
0.5 ൌ ܧൣܤ௝ ൌ 1|ܤ௞ ൌ 1, ܤି௝ ൌ ܾି௝൧
ൌ Prൣܤ௝ ൌ 1หܤ௞ ൌ 1, ܤି௝ ൌ ܾି௝ሿ	
ൌ Prൣܤ
௝ ൌ 1, ܤ௞ ൌ 1, ܤି௝ ൌ ܾି௝൧
Prሾܤ௞ ൌ 1, ܤି௝ ൌ ܾି௝ሿ  
(6) 
with ܾି௝ ൌ ሼ0,1ሽ depending on the individual’s decision, and where the last equality results 
simply from applying the definition of conditional probability as the ratio between the joint 
probability of the J products, to the joint probability of the conditioning J-1 random variables.  
Applying equation (3), the cross-reservation price is the value of  ݌௝௞ that solves the 
following highly nonlinear expression: 
0.5 ൌ 
Φ୎ൣ൫ߚ଴௝ ൅ ߚଵ௝݌௝௞ ൅ ࢆ′ࢾ௝൯, ൫ߚ଴௞ ൅ ߚଵ௞ ௜ܲ௞ ൅ ࢆ௜′ ࢾ௞൯, ݍି௝൫ߚ଴ି௝ ൅ ߚଵି௝ܲି௝ ൅ ࢆ′ࢾି௝൯, ܳ ∙ ࣋൧
Φ୎ିଵൣ൫ߚ଴௞ ൅ ߚଵ௞ ௜ܲ௞ ൅ ࢆ௜′ ࢾ௞൯, ݍି௝൫ߚ଴ି௝ ൅ ߚଵି௝ܲି௝ ൅ ࢆ′ࢾି௝൯, ܳ ∙ ࣋൧
 
(7) 
The numerator represents an individual’s joint decision to purchase all J products, arising 
from the value that takes the unobserved latent utility from deciding to buy the product at the 
offered price. The interpretation of the denominator is similar except that it is the joint decision 
for J-1 products. In general, as we have J purchase decisions, this comparison can be made either 
conditioning on purchasing one product k on the observed decision regarding the remaining (J-1) 
products, or any combination of purchasing/not purchasing the remaining (J-1) products. That is, 
without loss of generality, the same derivation is valid for analyzing any bundle of the J 
products. 
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 Importantly, interesting conclusions can be obtained by comparing the reservation price 
݌௝ which solves (7) with the unconditional reservation price which solves (5), because this 
difference quantifies the effect of the unobserved common taste on willingness to pay between 
any pair of sports j and k, for j ് k. 
Estimation of own- and cross-price effects  
 We can also calculate own-price and cross-price elasticities using the maximum 
likelihood estimates.  The probability of purchasing product j represents the estimated demand of 
individual i for that product. Therefore, the own-price demand elasticities of j is: 
ߝ௜௝௝ ൌ
1
݊෍
߲ܲൣܤ௜௝ ൌ 1൧
߲ ௜ܲ௝
௡
௜ୀଵ
∙ ௜ܲ
௝
ܲൣܤ௜௝ ൌ 1൧
 (8) 
Where n is the number of individuals in the sample. 
 For the cross-price elasticities between two products, consider the simultaneous joint 
decision of purchasing two product (j and k) at the offered prices ܲ௝ andܲ௞, respectively, and the 
observed decision regarding the remaining product (-j). In terms of probabilities we have: 
Prൣܤ௝ ൌ 1, ܤ௞ ൌ 1, ܤି௝ ൌ ܾି௝൧
ൌ Φ୎ൣ൫ߚ଴௝ ൅ ߚଵ௝ܲ௝ ൅ ࢆ′ࢾ௝൯, ൫ߚ଴௞ ൅ ߚଵ௞ܲ௞ ൅ ࢆ௜′ ࢾ௞൯, ݍି௝൫ߚ଴ି௝ ൅ ߚଵି௝ܲି௝ ൅ ࢆ′ࢾି௝൯, ܳ. ࣋൧
ൌ ܥ 
(9)
Which consists of the joint probability (demand) derived from the fact that, individually, the 
value of the unobserved latent utilities from consuming each good at the offered prices 
(ܲ௝, ܲ௞, ܲି௝) is higher than that of not buying in the cases the individual decided to purchase, 
and is lower in the cases the individual decides not to purchase. The value of ܥ is a scalar 
between 0 and 1, and is the probability associated with this individual’s decision given his or her 
particular characteristics. In order to find the cross-price elasticity of buying product j to changes 
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in the price of k, let us define ܲ௞∗ ൌ 	ܲ௞(1 + 0.01).7 By substituting ܲ௞ by ܲ௞∗ in (9) and leaving 
everything else unchanged, we can evaluate the induced change in ܲ௝ which leaves unchanged 
the probability (ܥ) of purchasing this combination of products. We denote this solution by ܲ௝∗, 
as the price of  j which solves the following non-linear implicit function:   
Prൣܤ௝ ൌ 1, ܤ௞ ൌ 1, ܤି௝ ൌ ܾି௝൧
ൌ Φ୎ൣ൫ߚ଴௝ ൅ ߚଵ௝ܲ௝∗ ൅ ࢆ′ࢾ௝൯, ൫ߚ଴௞ ൅ ߚଵ௞ܲ௞∗ ൅ ࢆ௜′ ࢾ௞൯, ݍି௝൫ߚ଴ି௝ ൅ ߚଵି௝ܲି௝ ൅ ࢆ′ࢾି௝൯, ܳ. ࣋൧
ൌ ܥ 
(10)
 Finally, in order to obtain the cross-price elasticity between j and k, i.e. the change in 
demand of  j due to a 1% change in price of  k, we employ equation (8) but where 
the change in price ܲ௝ in the denominator (which is exactly equal to [ܲ௝∗ ܲ௝⁄ െ 1]) is that 
induced by the 1% change in ܲ௞.  
A restatement of equation (9) for the case of two goods implies	Prൣܤ௝ ൌ 1, ܤ௞ ൌ 1൧ ൌ ܥ, 
and equation (10) can be expressed in the following way:	Φଶൣ൫ߚ଴௝ ൅ ߚଵ௝ܲ௝ ൅ ࢆ′ࢾ௝൯, ൫ߚ଴௞ ൅
ߚଵ௞ܲ௞ ൅ ࢆ௜′ ࢾ௞൯, ܳ. ࣋൧ 	ൌ ܥ. Applying total differentiation on both sides of the previous equation 
we obtain: 
 dሺΦଶൣ൫ߚ଴௝ ൅ ߚଵ௝ܲ௝ ൅ ࢆ′ࢾ௝൯, ൫ߚ଴௞ ൅ ߚଵ௞ܲ௞ ൅ ࢆ௜′ ࢾ௞൯, ܳ. ࣋൧ሻ ൌ 0    
Following Greene (2003) and remembering that ܲ௝ and ܲ௞ only appear in the demand 
equations for goods j and k respectively, we can compute the total differential as: 
ൣ߶൫ߚ଴௝ ൅ ߚଵ௝ܲ௝ ൅ ࢆ′ࢾ௝൯ߚଵ௝൧݀ܲ௝ ൅ ൣ߶൫ߚ଴௞ ൅ ߚଵ௞ܲ௞ ൅ ࢆ′ࢾ௞൯ߚଵ௞൧݀ܲ௞ ൌ 0 (11)
where ߶ is the univariate standard normal density. Rearranging terms in (11) we can derive the 
marginal rate of substitution between j and k for the probability of purchase ܥ as:  
                                                 
7 We arbitrary set the increment to 1%, but any other one could be defined. 
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	ܯܴ ଵܵ ൌ 	െ ݀ܲ
௝
݀ܲ௞ ൌ
߶ൣ൫ߚ଴௝ ൅ ߚଵ௝ܲ௝ ൅ ࢆ′ࢾ௝൯൧ߚଵ௝
߶ൣ൫ߚ଴௞ ൅ ߚଵ௞ܲ௞ ൅ ࢆ′ࢾ௞൯൧ߚଵ௞
 (12)
Equation (12) allows us to have, for a given pair of prices ܲ௝ and ܲ௞, the point on the 
indifference curve with utility level set consistent with joint probability C. This is illustrated in 
Panel A of figure 1.8 Additionally, these same prices are consistent with a level of marginal 
probability of buying products j and k as illustrated by ܲሺܤ௝ ൌ 1;	ܲ௝ሻ	 and ܲሺܤ௞ ൌ 1;	ܲ௞ሻ in 
panels B and C of figure 1, respectively. Applying the exercise previously described involves a 
movement along the indifference curve toward a new point with another marginal rate of 
substitution (ܯܴܵଶ) that give us another marginal probability of buying product j and k 
associated with prices ܲ௝∗  and ܲ௞∗ that are illustrated by ܲሺܤ௝ ൌ 1;	ܲ௝∗ሻ	and ܲሺܤ௞ ൌ 1;	ܲ௞∗ሻ. 
Using this, we can compute the change in the probability of buying product k when we 
exogenously increase the relative price of product j, holding utility fixed at the level consistent 
with at joint probability level	ܥ.  . 
As will become clear in the estimation subsection, this procedure is applied when the 
randomization in the experimental design yields the outcome that each demand is uncorrelated 
with the prices of the other products.  Therefore, this approach is exploiting the estimated 
unobserved correlation between equations. This approach could be useful in cases when pure 
substitution (compensated) effects are informative for practitioners or decision makers or to 
decompose uncompensated cross-price elasticities into income and substitution effects.     
Optimal pricing strategy 
In this application, the existence of cross-price effects determines that an optimal pricing 
strategy cannot be set individually by product, but rather, simultaneously for all products. We 
                                                 
8 Figure 1 assumes that the two goods are substitutes, but the same exercise can be conducted for complementary 
goods. 
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present an approach that is suitable for our particular case where cross-prices influence demand 
through the correlation in the errors. 
We set this up as a social planner’s problem with a utility function (ܹ) depending on the 
consumers’ utility (ܥ), the producer’s revenues (ܴ),9 and weights assigned to each, such that ݓ஼ 
between 0 and 1 is the one assigned to consumers. The social planner’s problem becomes: 
 
max௉భ,…,௉಻ 	ሼܹሽ ൌ max௉భ,…,௉಻ ݂ሺܥ, ܴ;ݓ஼ሻ
ܥ ൌ Φ୎ൣሺߚ଴ଵ ൅ ߚଵଵܲଵ ൅ ࢆ′ࢾଵሻ,⋯ , ൫ߚ଴௃ ൅ ߚଵ௃ܲ௃ ൅ ࢆ′ࢾ௃൯, ࣋൧	
ܴ ൌ ෍ ܲ௝ Pr൫ܤ௝ ൌ ܾ௝൯
௃
௝ୀଵ
ൌ ෍ ܲ௝Φൣ൫ߚ଴௝ ൅ ߚଵ௝ܲ௝ ൅ ࢆ′ࢾ௝൯൧
௃
௝ୀଵ
	 
(13) 
Revenues are increasing in prices but utility (probability of purchase) is decreasing in 
prices, therefore there exists a tradeoff between these two objective functions. While higher 
prices reduce consumer’s latent utility, they increase revenues through a direct effect. 
Nevertheless, they decrease revenues indirectly by reducing the probability of purchasing. As a 
result of this and the weighting preferences of the planner, together with the fact that these 
functions are well-behaved (a multivariate normal cdf’s and the univariate normal cdf’s), an 
optimal set of prices can be found.  
If the producer is able to set prices regardless of individuals’ welfare (	ݓ஼ → 0) our 
problem reduces to the planner solving for the price vector which maximize revenues.   On the 
other hand, if the planner places the greatest weight on consumers (	ݓ஼ → 1ሻ, in our case with no 
budget constraint, maximization of the joint-purchase decision will imply ܥ → 1, which is only 
possible if prices become negative. 
4. DATA 
                                                 
9 Revenue maximization is useful in case of goods and services characterized by a cost structure dominated by fixed 
costs, as in our case with sports events. 
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 Our application will be taken from the sale of intercollegiate sports tickets.  The National 
Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) regulates college and university sports in the United 
States.  These sports are big business.  In 2014, Division I-A Universities’ spent $7.8 billion on 
men’s and women’s sports, generating revenues of $8.2 billion (USED, 2016). However, only a 
few sports actually generate sufficient revenue to cover their costs. The profitable sports include 
men’s basketball which generated revenues of $1 billion against total expenses of $703 million, 
leaving a surplus of $298 million; and football with revenues of $3.7 billion against expenses of 
$2.1 billion, a surplus of $1.6 billion. Sports that fail to break even include women’s basketball, 
volleyball, wrestling, gymnastics, hockey and soccer with accumulated deficits of $375 million.  
Most universities struggle to earn enough profit in football and men’s basketball to cover their 
losses from the other sports.   
Revenue generation depends on attendance.  Men´s basketball and football have turnouts 
of 28 and 44 million spectators in 2014 respectively, while women´s basketball attracted only 8 
million attendees during that year (NCAA, 2016).10 However, fans willing to attend women’s 
basketball may be revealing themselves to be atypically committed supporters who would be 
willing to attend other sports as well.  If so, colleges and universities could augment revenues 
and/or increase attendance at less profitable sports by incorporating underlying complementary 
preferences for various sports into their ticket pricing strategies.   
In this study, we compute the willingness to pay for 8 intercollegiate sports using data 
from a market experiment carried out at Iowa State University (ISU) in 2006.  We demonstrate 
that willingness to pay for a given sports can be measured using decisions to accept or reject 
randomly priced men’s and women’s sports tickets in a simulated market.  The parameters allow 
us to predict the probability of ticket purchase at any given price, and so we can estimate the 
                                                 
10 We do not have access to systematized data on attendance for the rest of the mentioned sports. 
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reservation prices (or willingness to pay) at which each individual is indifferent between buying 
and not buying a ticket for each of the eight sports. These responses also allow us to compute 
own- and cross-price elasticities using a novel application of multivariate probit analysis which 
we present in the next section. 
The theoretical model requires that each individual be given the opportunity to purchase 
or refuse a product.  We also require sufficient variation in prices to identify the behavioral 
responses, ߚመଵ௝ for j = 1,2,…,J in equation (1).  Such data would not be commonly available in 
market transactions, and so we developed an artificial environment where appropriate data could 
be obtained. The universe of potential customers in this study is the undergraduate student 
population at Iowa State University.  
In 2007, a random sample of 2000 students was invited by Email to participate in a web-
based survey. Of these, 470 (23.5%) provided complete responses, and they represent the 
working sample for this study.  The working sample reflected the attributes of the sample 
universe well, and so there does not appear to be any systematic relationship between observable 
student attributes and the likelihood of survey response. Table 1 describes the working sample. 
The Iowa State student body is a particularly useful universe of potential subjects for this 
type of study.  ISU students place a lot of importance on sports. In our sample, 43% of the 
participants in the study were fans of the college before attending ISU, 65% played intramural 
sports at the university and 68% played varsity sports in high school. Most continue to support 
ISU sports while students at the university.  The ISU athletics budget follows the NCAA 
Division I-A pattern of profitable football and men’s basketball and negative returns to the rest 
of the sorts.  While men´s basketball and football ended 2014 with surpluses of $4 million and 
$18 million respectively, the rest of the sports had an accumulated deficit of $15 million.  Even 
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women’s basketball, which has consistently ranked among the top ten in attendance nationally, 
had losses of $3 million.   
In addition to demographic information and questions related to participation and interest 
in sports, each respondent was asked whether they would purchase the next sports tickets at a 
stated price: a) a women’s basketball ticket, b) a men’s basketball ticket, c) a football ticket, d) a 
volleyball ticket, e) a wrestling ticket, f) a gymnastics ticket, g) a hockey ticket, and h) a soccer 
ticket.  
Prices were generated from independent random draws from uniform price distributions.  
The men’s basketball price was drawn from the uniform distribution U(7, 20) and rounded to the 
nearest whole number. Football prices were the nearest whole number drawn from the 
distribution U(13, 25). The rest of the sports prices were rounded to the nearest whole number 
from numbers drawn from the uniform distribution U(1, 10). The median value in each 
distribution was the current student ticket price.  
Because each respondent received a randomly drawn price, there is no correlation with 
the control variables	ܼ௜.  As a result, we get virtually identical response parameters to the prices 
regardless of whether or not the	ܼ௜’s are included in the estimation.  Nevertheless, it is useful to 
highlight some of the more interesting control variables used in the analysis.  To control for 
overall interest in sports, we included information on whether the individual played varsity sports 
in high school and whether the individual participated in intramurals in school or in Iowa State.  
To control for demand for Iowa State sports more specifically, we ask whether the individual 
was an Iowa State fan before coming to college and whether they had parents or relatives 
graduate from Iowa State.  We control for differences in tastes between men and women by 
including a gender dummy variable.  
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A useful check on the success of the price randomization is to plot the probability of a 
positive purchase response by random price offered.  If respondents are following the law of 
demand, we should be able to trace out standard demand relationships from data plots. This is 
shown in figure 2. While the relationship is not perfectly monotonic, the fitted bivariate 
relationship between intent to purchase and price satisfies the law of demand: the higher the 
price, the lower the proportion of people willing to buy the ticket.  
 Additionally, figure 3 illustrates an example of the differences existing between the 
demand relationships for men’s basketball between people who purchased another sport ticket 
(football) and people who did not. The fraction of people who stated they would buy a men’s 
basketball ticket at the offered price is higher when conditioned on a positive response for 
purchasing a football ticket.  This descriptive result shows the possibility of exploiting the 
unobserved common taste for pricing tickets, such as, creating bundling strategies.  In general, 
and as our estimations will show, it is expected that willingness to purchase a given sport’s ticket 
be different conditional on the decision the person made on other sports.  
5. RESULTS 
After presenting results for point estimates, we continue showing the results in the same order as 
structured in section 4.  
A. Point estimates 
The equations system (2) constitutes a seemingly unrelated 8-variate probit model.  We 
estimate the system using simulated maximum likelihood.11 A total of 400 draws from the 
likelihood function distribution are taken to compute the simulated likelihood in each iteration of 
the optimization algorithm. Table 2 reports the results. 
                                                 
11 Simulated maximum likelihood is more accurate than conventional or exact maximum likelihood in estimating 
multivariate models, probits in particular, due to the difficulty in finding closed forms of the probabilities 
maximized as the number of equations increases (Cappellari and Jenkins, 2003).  
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For the above estimation, the Wald test shows that all estimated parameters in the 
regression equations jointly statistically significant. Also, the likelihood ratio test of the joint 
significance of the elements of the correlation matrix of the errors, ߩ௝௞, rejected the null 
hypothesis of zero correlations.  Finally, the joint hypothesis that the individual characteristics 
used as control variables could be dropped from all the equations was soundly rejected with 
߯ଶሺ48ሻ ൌ119.40. For that reason, we opted to include all control variables in all equations even 
though some of them are individually non-significant.   
The own-price effects are all negative and significant. An increase on the price of the 
ticket reduces the probability of purchasing as the law of demand states.  Men were more likely 
than women to buy all sports tickets except for men’s basketball.  Individuals who were Iowa 
State fans before coming to college were more likely to buy all sports tickets.  Individuals who 
played sports in high school or college, whether organized sports or intramurals, were more 
likely to buy basketball and football tickets, but the relationship between sports participation and 
ticket demand is mixed for the other sports. 
Another important issue related to the econometric design is that the order of the sports 
ticket price offered on the experimental design did not vary. Respondents were offered tickets in 
this order: women’s basketball, men’s basketball, football, volleyball, wrestling, gymnastics, 
hockey and soccer. This ordering could bias the estimation due to priming: the response to one 
price is influenced by the previously offered price. For example, if individuals received a low 
price offer and that causes them to buy the first sports ticket, then their decision on the second 
sports ticket may change compared to their response were they not have been offered a low price 
on the first sports ticket. To test whether this bias clouds our results, we conducted a re-
estimation that includes the price of the sport that was previously offered. As shown in Appendix 
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table A1, our own price coefficients are unaffected by the inclusion or exclusion of the other 
sports pries.   Even in the few cases when it is significant, the own price coefficient hardly 
changed, suggesting that the randomized price strategy successfully avoided the potential 
priming problem.12  
Our robustness tests confirmed that a) our model includes enough explanatory variables 
because adding other prices does not change the own-price coefficient; and b) the fact that the 
previously offered prices do not alter the own-price coefficient means that our price responses 
are interpretable as the outcome of simultaneous purchasing decisions rather than sequential 
purchasing decisions. These findings, and the fact that purchasing decision of one sport does not 
prevent from buying other sports, support the use of seemingly unrelated multivariate probit as 
the appropriate specification rather than conditional probits, multinomial probits, multinomial 
logits13, and nested logits, all of whom assume sequential decisions.14 
B. Correlation in unobserved demand for sport tickets 
The cross-equation error correlations from equation (2) are reported in Table 3.  All 
estimated correlations are positive, implying that the unobserved factors that prompt individuals 
to purchase tickets for one sport are positively correlated with the unobserved factors that prompt 
individuals to purchase tickets of all the other sports. Moreover, in all cases (except for the 
combination of football and soccer) estimations are statistically significant. The correlations 
suggest some interesting marketing strategies, such as bundling, particularly for sports that have 
difficulty attracting fans.  For example, individuals who have an unusual strong interest in soccer 
                                                 
12 We conducted a similar robustness check including all cross-prices, and similar results were obtained. Almost no 
price of sport j different from sport i was significant to explain decision of buying or not sport i.  
13 For a comparison between multivariate probit and multinomial logit see Young et al. (2009).  
14 Although we consider that the underlying latent utility is probabilistic and nonlinear, we also estimated an SUR 
linear probability model to test robustness to the functional form specification and the sensibility to the 
reparametrization of the variance and covariance matrix of the error terms embedded in the probit estimation. This 
model yields similar estimates of marginal effects and of unobserved correlation coefficients. Results are available 
upon request. 
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are also more likely to buy volleyball, gymnastics and hockey tickets.  Because these sports have 
non-overlapping sections of their seasons, the time budget constraints do not force the sports to 
be substitutes. 
C. Unconditional willingness to pay or reservation prices 
Results for this section are derived by solving equation (5) for a reservation price for each 
individual in the sample for each of the 8 sports. A reservation price is defined as the price level 
that leaves the individual indifferent between purchasing or not purchasing a ticket for the 
corresponding sport. For each sport, Table 4 reports the mean, median and standard deviation of 
the reservation prices over the sample of 449 individuals. When comparing mean or median 
reservation price for each sport with the actual ticket price charged, we can identify the sports 
that charge less than students’ average willingness to pay.  Results show that this is the case for 
women´s and men´s basketball, football and hockey. They also show that wrestling prices are set 
at the same level as the reservation price.  
 While it is clear that a price increase may reduce demand by a quantity that make 
revenues to decrease, our setup let us compute the exact price that maximize revenues, because 
we identified the whole demand function for each sport, as shown in subsection 5.D. 
D.  Conditional reservation prices  
Results in this section arise from numerically solving the nonlinear equation in (7) for a 
reservation price (݌௝௞) for each individual in the sample who decided to purchase both tickets, 
say for example, women’s basketball (j) and men’s basketball (k). The solution of equation (7) 
for a reservation price is performed by evaluating explanatory variables in vector ࢆ at the 
observed value for each individual, and ܤି௝ at the actual decision each individual made (which, 
in turn, implies computing the actual value of ݍି௝ for each individual). The Bisection method is 
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employed given that it consists of one equation in one unknown. Following this procedure, we 
compute conditional reservation prices for each pair of sports, which are then compared to the 
unconditional reservation prices estimated in the last section for the conditioned sport. 
Table 5 summarizes the results. Conditional reservation prices are higher than their 
unconditional counterparts for each combination of sports; this has an appealing economic 
interpretation, i.e., the unobserved common taste for the group of goods translates into 
willingness to pay, consistent with the complementarity concluded in subsection B. People who 
already have a ticket to one sport event have higher willingness to pay for the other sport. For 
example, individuals who purchased a men’s basketball ticket are willing to pay an average of 
41% more for a women’s basketball ticket, compared to the unconditional estimated willingness 
to pay.15    
In addition to these results, we can check how the variability of individual’s choices shifts 
between the conditional and the unconditional case. We compare the coefficient of variation of 
unconditional reservation prices (standard deviation of	ܲ௝ over median ܲ௝) and the coefficient of 
variation of conditional reservation prices (standard deviation of ܲ௝௞ over median ܲ௝௞).16  In the 
majority of cases, the conditional reservation prices have more variability and are less 
concentrated than unconditional reservation prices, but there is no clear generalizable pattern.  A 
similar exercise can be done for the change on the Skewness of conditional prices compared to 
unconditional prices. In almost every case, the difference is negative, meaning that the 
distribution of the reservation prices shifts upward when conditioned on other sports purchases.  
E. Own-price and cross-price elasticities 
                                                 
15 Tables A2 and A3 in the appendix show, respectively, the median ܲ௝௞	 and median ܲ௝ used to construct each cell 
of Table 5. 
16 Detailed results for each sports pair are not shown due to space, but are available from the authors upon request.  
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The Slutsky equations establish that the own price elasticity of demand for sport j is 
ߝ௝௝ ൌ ߦ௝௝ െ ߠ௝ߟ௝, where ߦ௝௝ is the compensated elasticity (i.e. the change in demand of j which 
leaves the individual in the same level of utility), ߠ௝ is the budget share for the jth sport, and ߟ௝ is 
the income elasticity of demand for the jth sport. Similarly, the Slutsky equations for cross-price 
elasticities between any two sports j and k, j ≠ k, establish that ߝ௝௞ ൌ ߦ௝௞ െ ߠ௞ߟ௝, where ߝ௝௞ is the 
cross-price elasticity of demand due to a change in price of sport k,  ߦ௝௞ is the compensated 
cross-price elasticity (i.e. the change in demand of j which leaves the individual at the same level 
of utility after a change in price of k), ߠ௞ is the budget share for the kth sport, and ߟ௝ is the 
income elasticity of demand for the jth sport.  
The randomization of the experimental design implies that decisions for each sport are 
made independently from those for the other sports (which in this set up can be translated in the 
lack of income effects	ߠ௝ ≅ 0), yielding an approximate equality between the uncompensated 
demand elasticities and their compensated counterparts (ߝ௝௞ ≅ ߦ௝௞ and ߝ௝௝ ≅ ߦ௝௝). Having this in 
mind, we present in this section, results for own-price compensated demand elasticities for the 
eight sports and cross-price compensated elasticities for sport j after a change in sport k price 
using the methodology presented in section 4.  
These are reported in table 6.  To illustrate the interpretation, the first number shows that 
a 1% change in women’s basketball price induces a median reduction of 0.46% in the probability 
of purchasing a women’s basketball ticket.  All the diagonal estimates are negative, and so price 
increases lower probability of sale. Only men’s basketball is in the elastic range, and so prices 
could be raised to increase revenue for all other sports.  The cross-price elasticities are all 
positive, and so all sport tickets are substitutes. We infer that while the unobserved correlation 
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between sports (shown in part C) was estimated as positive (i.e. complementary goods) and can 
be interpreted as “pure taste for sports”, holding taste fixed, tickets are substitutes.  
In other words, this complementarity is not large enough to drive a negative cross-price 
effect, but ignoring it would lead to an overestimation on average of the substitutability between 
sports.  This overestimation would yield a pricing policy with at least some prices lower than 
what they would be if the unobserved correlation is taken into account, lowering revenue 
generation from the maximum possible. Therefore, our approach calls for the importance of 
setting pricing strategies in a multivariate framework when goods of interest can be considered 
members of the same cluster. 
F. Optimal pricing strategy simultaneously determined for all sports 
Results for this section arise from solving problem in (13) for a set of prices for each 
sport, assuming a linear utility for the planner. The problem is highly non-linear and of high 
dimension (8 dimensions), making it hard to find a closed-form solution. Therefore, we solve it 
numerically using the Davidon-Fletcher-Powell (DFP) Quasi-Newton optimization method. 
A salient feature of these applications is the role played by the social planner who can 
decide how much to weight producer’s revenues versus consumer utility. In our application we 
could think of the social planner as University President or Board of Regents; the consumers 
being the public attending the events or the alumni monitoring sports success through the media; 
and the producer as the athletics department. Revenues are normalized by maximum revenues 
possible (the revenues attained if all the weight is assigned to the producer, that is ݓ஼ = 0) and 
therefore they range between 0 and 1, as it does joint utility because it is a probability. 
One key aspect of this approach is that demographics of individuals (given by variable ࢆ 
in problem (13)) condition the optimization results. If strategies for price discrimination are 
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limited, as it is the case with sport tickets, we may describe individuals by a representative 
consumer.17 First, suppose the representative consumer is the median individual18 and the same 
weight is given to both the producer and consumers (ݓ஼ = 0.5). Table 7 shows the resulting 
optimal price strategy, which when compared to the actual prices, it implies to lower the prices 
of men’s basketball, football and volleyball, and increase the rest. It turns out that actual prices 
yield lower revenues for the producer (and lower utility for the planner), but they do provide 
higher joint latent utility for the median consumer. 
 In order to show how the optimization works, figure 4 depicts the optimal solution in 
normalized revenues and joint utility scale (black diamond). As mentioned above, both joint 
utility and revenues range between 0 and 1. Points to the right and above the black lines, while 
Pareto superior, are not attainable because the maximum is obtained at the black diamond. 
However, points with either higher utility or higher revenues are possible but will not maximize 
planner’s objective function; they will lie to the left and below the blue frontier. The blue frontier 
indicates all the utility and revenue pairs which leave the planner with a value function at a level 
equal to the optimum.19 To its left, the planner’s value function is lower. To illustrate this, we 
generate 2000 sets of 8 uncorrelated random prices and observe that the revenue and utility they 
yield lie in all cases in the mentioned region indicated by blue dots. Finally, this random set of 
prices also show that pairs of revenue and utility between the blue frontier and black lines are 
also not attainable due to the tradeoff between utility and revenue functions. 
                                                 
17As we already noticed, our setup allows pursuing a pricing strategy for each individual in the sample which is 
consistent with goods or services when a first-degree price discrimination is possible. 
18 A male, who played varsity sports in high school, did not play intramurals in high school but did in Iowa State, 
and neither has relatives graduated from Iowa State nor was a Cyclone fan before coming to school. 
19 The tradeoff between revenues and consumer’s utility indicates that if consumers have zero joint utility, it requires 
the planner to have revenues higher than 1 (the maximum attainable) in order to have the same utility as that of the 
optimum. 
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 If the planner gives more weight to the producer, for example if ݓ஼ goes from 0.5 to zero, 
it is expected that the pricing strategy yields higher revenues for the producer and lower joint 
utility for the median consumer. The extreme case, where all the weight is given to the producer 
(ݓ஼ → 0) is indicated with a black asterisk in figure 5.20 More cases are shown in the appendix. 
The approach described above makes little use of the information available from the 
individual’s demographics. A more “informed” strategy for both the planner and producer could 
be to rely on the knowledge of how these demographics determine optimal prices for each sport. 
For example, consider the specification of types of individuals which represent strata in the 
population. As each type yields a different pricing strategy, the planner may set the overall 
optimal strategy as a weighted average across strata.21 Table 8 shows the optimal pricing strategy 
for each type (types are described at the bottom of the table). As expected, it is optimal to charge 
higher prices of women’s basketball to women than to men, and higher prices of men’s 
basketball tickets to men compared to women. It is also optimal to charge women higher prices 
for women’s volleyball, soccer and gymnastics, but almost the same price as men for football, 
wrestling and hockey. Higher prices should also be charged to self-professed ISU fans, 
especially for basketball and football. Having played sports does not significantly affect optimal 
prices. Considering these differences, an optimal pricing strategy may be constructed as some 
weighted average of the different customer types or else strategic discounts from a common price 
could be targeted to the more price sensitive groups. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
This analysis is an extension of Greene’s (2003) conditional marginal effects framework 
to estimate reservation prices conditional on having decided to purchase another offered product. 
                                                 
20 It is likely that for most goods and services this is the only scenario of interest. 
21 Recall that price discrimination is not possible in this case, so only one price must be available for each sport at 
the tickets office. 
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This allows us to identify complementarities or substitutabilities among the offered goods which 
informs optimal marketing and pricing strategies. Additionally, besides estimating own-price 
elasticities in a standard fashion, we propose a method to estimate compensated cross-price 
elasticities of substitution among goods, exploiting the unobserved correlation among the 
demands of the goods modeled. The existence of cross-price effects in demand supports a pricing 
strategy which considers all offered goods simultaneously rather than separately. Our approach 
solves for the set of prices which maximize the utility of a social planner whose objective 
function depends on both producer’s revenues and consumer’s joint latent utility. Different 
weights can be assigned to each agent depending on the particular application, for example, all 
the weight collapsing to the producer or equal weight to both.  
We illustrate the method using data from a contingent valuation survey administered at 
Iowa State University.  Students were given the option to buy or reject 8 offered college sports 
tickets at randomly assigned prices.   The correlations among the error terms from the equations 
predicting the buy/not buy decision are all positive and significant, proof that there are 
unobserved factors tied to tastes for sports which prompts attending sport events regardless of the 
discipline, i.e. inducing complementary between the goods. 
When we compare the conditional to the unconditional reservation prices, we find that for 
almost all sports, people who buy any one ticket are more likely to pay more for other sports 
tickets.    Because we show the demands are consistent with simultaneous decisions of whether 
to buy all 8 tickets, our results suggest that the sports should be marketed together rather than 
separately, for example opening the possibility of making product bundles.   Estimation of cross-
price elasticities show that, holding taste for sports constant, they are substitute goods. The 
mentioned complementarity is not large enough to drive a negative cross-price effect, but 
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ignoring it would overestimate on average the substitutability between sports, leading to a 
pricing policy with at least some prices lower than what they would be otherwise with its 
consequences on revenue generation. As such, our approach calls for building pricing strategies 
in a multivariate framework, suggesting to avoid single equation estimations for goods 
categorized in clusters. Finally, the social planner’s optimal pricing strategy yields that prices for 
some sports should be raised but others lowered. 
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TABLES 
 
Table 1. Summary statistics.  
Variable Mean Standard deviation Description 
Bwbb 57.9% 49.4% = 1 if buys women’s basketball ticket 
Bmbb 53.5% 50.0% = 1 if buys men’s basketball ticket 
Bf 61.9% 48.6% = 1 if buys football ticket 
Bv 42.2% 49.4%  = 1 if buys volleyball ticket 
Bwres 49.2% 50.0% = 1 if buys wrestling ticket 
Bgym 47.9% 50.0%  = 1 if buys gymnastics ticket 
Bh 58.1% 49.4% = 1 if buys hockey ticket 
Bs 40.4% 49.1%  = 1 if buys soccer ticket 
Pwbb 5.63 2.83 Random price of women’s basketball ticket offered 
Pmbb 13.65 3.99 Random price of men’s basketball ticket offered 
Pf 18.83 3.81 Random price of football ticket offered 
Pv 5.46 2.86 Random price of voleyball ticket offered 
Pwres 5.40 2.93 Random price of wrestling ticket offered 
Pgym 5.71 2.89 Random price of gymnastics ticket offered 
Ph 5.39 2.81 Random price of hockey ticket offered 
Ps 5.56 2.90 Random price of soccer ticket offered 
Gender 52.2% 50.0% =1 if male 
hi_sport 67.7% 46.8% = 1 if played varsity sports in high school 
hi_inter 38.3% 48.7%  = 1 if plays intramurals in high school 
isu_inter 64.6% 47.9% = 1 if plays intramurals in school 
isu_family 40.8% 49.2% = 1 if parents, grandparents or siblings attended ISU 
isu_fan 42.9% 49.5% = 1 if was a Cyclone fun before attending ISU 
N 471  Number of observations 
Note: ISU = Iowa State University  
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Table 2. Simulated maximum likelihood estimation of seemingly unrelated model in (2). 
Dependent variable: Binary choice of purchasing ticket of sport j, ࡮࢐, with j = 1,2,…,8. 
Standard errors in brackets. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Dep. 
variable womenbb menbb football volleyball wrestling Gym hockey soccer  
own price 
-0.126*** -0.106*** -0.076*** -0.176*** -0.143*** -0.133*** -0.168*** -0.118*** 
(0.022) (0.017) (0.018) (0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.022) 
gender -0.545*** 0.084 -0.101 -0.294** -0.144 -0.672*** -0.209 -0.268* (0.141) (0.137) (0.144) (0.143) (0.140) (0.143) (0.139) (0.141) 
hi_sport 
0.183 0.037 -0.037 0.17  0.634*** 0.034 -0.025 0.124 
(0.157) (0.148) (0.157) (0.159) (0.165) (0.164) (0.156) (0.161) 
hi_inter 
0.052 0.049 0.224 -0.007 -0.229 -0.109 0.036 0.055 
(0.145) (0.141) (0.149) (0.152) (0.154) (0.154) (0.148) (0.153) 
isu_inter 
0.239  0.315**  0.469*** -0.018  0.318** -0.065 0.112 0.056 
(0.160) (0.155) (0.154) (0.159) (0.150) (0.161) (0.157) (0.158) 
isu_famil 
0.004 -0.002 -0.068 -0.112 0.006 0.03 -0.187 -0.053 
(0.157) (0.154) (0.156) (0.160) (0.156) (0.156) (0.156) (0.158) 
isu_fan 
 0.490***  0.425***  0.444***  0.262*  0.335** 0.117 0.119  0.308** 
(0.152) (0.156) (0.153) (0.157) (0.158) (0.156) (0.155) (0.154) 
constant 
 0.653***  1.085***  1.304***  0.709*** 0.1  1.046***  1.197*** 0.277 
(0.189) (0.278) (0.383) (0.195) (0.220) (0.212) (0.214) (0.197) 
N = 449 – Simulation draws = 400 – LogLikelihood = -1,919 – Iterations = 33 
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Table 3. Estimation of correlation coefficient parameters࣋࢐࢑, with j,k = 1,2,…,8. Based on 
equation (3). 
Dependent 
variable 
women 
bb men bb 
footb
all volleyball wrestling gym hockey soccer 
women bb 1.00     
men bb 0.51 1.00   
football  0.20 0.60 1.00   
volleyball  0.70 0.38 0.20 1.00   
wrestling  0.44 0.30 0.23 0.53 1.00   
gym  0.59 0.33 0.24 0.60 0.45 1.00  
hockey 0.42 0.28 0.27 0.52 0.42 0.55 1.00 
soccer 0.52 0.30 0.12 0.57 0.41 0.62 0.57 1.00
Note: All parameters are statistically significant at 5% except for ߩଷ଼ and ߩ଼ଷ 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. Estimated unconditional reservation prices of sport tickets, and comparison with 
actual ticket prices. Based on equation (5) 
  women bb men bb football volleyball wrestling gym hockey soccer
Actual price 5.00 13.50 19.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 
 Estimated reservation price 
Median  7.08 14.46 23.33 4.07 5.17 3.95 6.72 3.42 
Mean 7.00 14.67 23.40 4.12 5.01 5.28 6.76 3.31 
Std. deviation 3.06 2.62 4.37 1.17 2.83 2.74 0.83 1.76 
N 449 449 449 449 449 449 449 449 
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Table 5. Estimated percent increment of conditional reservation prices of sport tickets 
relative to unconditional reservation prices.  
  k 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
j Labels womenbb menbb football voleyball wrestling gymnastics hockey soccer 
1 womenbb   40.5% 29.4% 48.4% 30.4% 40.9% 31.0% 41.5%
2 menbb 40.7%   37.0% 40.9% 29.7% 39.4% 33.9% 33.6%
3 football 21.8% 20.2%   19.8% 12.5% 20.8% 18.6% 16.4%
4 voleyball 85.4% 79.9% 74.2%   68.7% 78.6% 86.6% 95.1%
5 wrestling 54.4% 43.3% 40.6% 70.7%   67.4% 44.6% 57.4%
6 gymnastics 44.5% 52.0% 32.8% 48.7% 36.7%   46.5% 33.0%
7 hockey 38.6% 39.1% 32.5% 46.7% 23.7% 45.8%   44.6%
8 soccer 156.4% 160.8% 142.7% 169.8% 142.7% 172.7% 170.4%   
Note: Main diagonal elements have no significant meaning, therefore they are dropped. A useful hint to read this 
table and grasp the absolute values of conditional prices, increase the sport price in Table 3 by the percentage of 
interest corresponding to the row where the percentage is. 
Percentage increment defined as	ሺܲ௝௞ െ ܲ௝ሻ ܲ௝⁄  where ܲ௝௞ is the conditional price of j on k and ܲ௝ the 
unconditional price of j. Based on equation (7).   
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Table 6. Estimated elasticities for the eight sports evaluated at the median based on 
equation (8). Main diagonal are own-price elasticities and the rest are cross-price. 
  k 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
j Labels womenbb menbb football voleyball wrestling gymnastics hockey soccer
1 womenbb -0.46 0.80 0.85 0.53 0.51 0.45 0.44 0.54 
2 menbb 0.49 -1.10 0.68 0.68 0.54 0.46 0.45 0.46 
3 football 0.33 0.95 -0.82 0.56 0.38 0.45 0.48 0.37 
4 voleyball 0.28 1.06 0.87 -0.96 0.50 0.40 0.36 0.49 
5 wrestling 0.32 0.74 0.66 0.39 -0.64 0.35 0.43 0.38 
6 gymnastics 0.42 1.03 0.73 0.48 0.51 -0.61 0.38 0.53 
7 hockey 0.43 0.83 0.78 0.37 0.45 0.42 -0.62 0.58 
8 soccer 0.25 0.83 0.71 0.46 0.41 0.34 0.33 -0.66 
Note: The median was chosen instead of the mean because of the skewness of the distribution of the elasticities.  
 
 
Table 7. Comparison of optimal pricing strategy with actual prices and reservation prices. 
Optimal pricing is solution of problem (13) for ࢝࡯ = 0.5. 
  women bb men bb football volleyball wrestling gym hockey soccer
 Actual prices and estimated reservation prices 
Actual price 5.00 13.50 19.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 
Median WTP 7.08 14.46 23.33 4.07 5.17 3.95 6.72 3.42 
 Optimal pricing strategy 
Mean 6.48 12.61 18.24 4.62 6.67 5.36 6.39 5.14 
 
 
 
Table 8. Optimal pricing strategy by type of individuals. Solution of problem in (13) for 
different types and ࢝࡯ = 0.5 
 Type women bb men bb football volleyball wrestling gym hockey soccer
I 8.27 15.07 22.88 4.51 6.61 4.49 5.63 5.81 
II 10.62 14.08 23.44 5.09 6.63 7.14 6.08 6.55 
III 7.26 14.60 21.37 4.04 5.10 5.40 5.88 5.16 
IV 9.59 13.88 21.99 4.69 5.16 7.65 6.20 5.80 
V 6.14 11.45 16.70 4.95 5.31 5.72 6.38 5.83 
VI 7.32 10.30 16.73 5.09 4.17 7.13 6.27 5.37 
VII 5.49 11.15 15.35 5.02 3.76 6.13 6.52 6.05 
VIII 6.94 10.38 15.86 5.03 3.53 8.20 6.74 5.69 
Note: Types I and II play sports and are ISU fans, male and female respectively. Types III and IV, do not play sports 
but are ISU fans, male and female respectively. Types V and VI play sports but are not ISU fans, also male and 
female respectively. Types VII and VII neither play sports nor are ISU fans, male and female respectively. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table A1. Simulated maximum likelihood estimation of seemingly unrelated model in (2) 
but including the price offered previously. Dependent variable: Binary choice of 
purchasing ticket of sport j, ࡮࢐, with j = 1,2,…,8. 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Dependent 
variable womenbb menbb football volleyball wrestling gym hockey soccer 
own price   -0.114***   -0.098***   -0.078***   -0.179***   -0.138***   -0.132***   -0.166***   -0.118***
price 
previously 
offered 
-    0.057**     0.024      -0.002      -0.019       0.029      -0.003       0.011    
gender     -0.543***    0.109      -0.081      -0.294**    -0.137      -0.675***   -0.209      -0.267*   
hi_sport    0.181       0.016      -0.035       0.164       0.632***    0.035      -0.030       0.123    
hi_inter    0.057       0.067       0.226      -0.004      -0.227      -0.105       0.034       0.048    
isu_inter    0.235       0.287*      0.461***   -0.017       0.314**    -0.067       0.112       0.058    
isu_family    0.008      -0.004      -0.058      -0.114       0.008       0.018      -0.188      -0.052    
isu_fan     0.492***    0.424***    0.456***    0.265       0.336**     0.127       0.118       0.309**  
constant    0.587***    0.664**     0.984**     0.763**     0.178       0.884***    1.209***    0.220    
N=449 - Simulation draws=400- Loglikelihood= 1,919 - Iterations= 34 
 
 
Table A2 Median of unconditional reservation prices of sport j for individuals who buy 
sport j and k. Based on equation (5). 
  k 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
j Labels womenbb menbb football voleyball wrestling gymnastics hockey soccer 
1 womenbb   8.13 8.13 8.52 8.51 8.51 8.13 8.13 
2 menbb 14.79   14.81 14.58 14.79 14.58 14.58 14.74 
3 football 24.05 24.46   23.57 24.30 23.12 23.45 23.33 
4 voleyball 4.67 4.67 4.36   4.67 4.67 4.32 4.36 
5 wrestling 6.35 6.35 6.35 5.80   5.80 6.35 5.76 
6 gymnastics 7.44 6.92 7.38 7.38 7.38   7.44 7.63 
7 hockey 6.98 6.61 6.74 6.76 6.98 6.98   6.76 
8 soccer 3.87 3.76 3.76 3.87 3.81 3.76 3.75   
Note: Main Diagonal elements are 0 because they have no meaning. 
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Table A3. Median of conditional reservation prices for individuals who buy the pair of 
sport jk. Based on equation (7). 
  k 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
j Labels womenbb menbb football voleyball wrestling gymnastics hockey soccer 
1 womenbb 7.08 11.42 10.52 12.64 11.09 11.99 10.65 11.50 
2 menbb 20.81 14.46 20.30 20.54 19.19 20.32 19.52 19.69 
3 football 29.29 29.39 23.33 28.23 27.33 27.94 27.82 27.15 
4 voleyball 8.66 8.40 7.59 4.07 7.88 8.34 8.06 8.50 
5 wrestling 9.80 9.10 8.92 9.89 5.17 9.71 9.18 9.06 
6 gymnastics 10.75 10.52 9.79 10.97 10.09 3.95 10.89 10.15 
7 hockey 9.67 9.20 8.93 9.92 8.63 10.17 6.72 9.78 
8 soccer 9.92 9.81 9.13 10.45 9.26 10.26 10.13 3.42 
Note: Main diagonal is shows the median unconditional reservation price for all the sample (not only those who bought sports jk 
as it is the case with table A3). 
 
 
 
Weighting strategies scenarios. If the planner gives more weight to the producer, it is expected 
that the pricing strategy yields higher revenues for the producer and lower joint utility for the 
median consumer. This pattern is shown in figure A.1 where blue dots represent optimal 
solutions as ݓ஼ decreases from 0.8 through 0.05; more precisely we set ݓ஼ = {0.80, 0.70, 0.65, 
0.60, 0.55, 0.50, 0.45, 0.35, 0.25, 0.15, 0.05}. The black diamond is ݓ஼ = 0.5 and the black star 
is ݓ஼ = 0.05. As weight put into producer revenues approaches to one, higher revenues come at a 
cost for the planner, because require foregoing relatively more utility from consumers.  
It is likely that for most goods and services, the situation where the weighting to 
consumers collapses to zero is the only scenario of interest, i.e., the case of the maximization of 
revenues alone.  
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